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THE CONTAINER AFTERMATH: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA'S
UNITARY CORPORATE TAX CONCEPT AS APPLIED
TO A FOREIGN PARENT CORPORATION
I. INTRODUCTION
California taxes corporate income under the "unitary business"
method. The United States Supreme Court, in Container Corpora-
tion of America v. Franchise Tax Board,' recently upheld Califor-
nia's "unitary business" three-factor apportionment formula as con-
stitutional. 2 The case involved an allegation that the state's unitary
taxation method violated the due process and commerce clauses.3 Al-
though the Court upheld the constitutionality of the system, its hold-
ing was limited to domestic corporations doing business worldwide.
The Court did not address the question of whether California's sys-
tem of taxing corporate worldwide income would be valid under the
foreign commerce clause if the taxpayer is a foreign parent corpora-
tion with a United States subsidiary that operates within California.4
This comment examines the constitutionality of the three-factor
apportionment formula that California uses to tax the unitary in-
come of a foreign parent corporation that operates a subsidiary in
California. The foreign commerce clause' provides the constitutional
analysis which is applied to these parent corporations. Under the
foreign commerce clause, a state may not tax an instrumentality of
foreign commerce if there is a risk of multiple taxation." Further, a
state may not impose a tax if: 1) it would impair an area in which
federal uniformity is essential,7 or 2) it would prevent the federal
government from speaking with one voice in international trade.'
This comment will first discuss California's unitary tax concept.
This taxation method initially determines whether a business organi-
c 1985 by Randel Mathias
1. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
2. Id. For a description of California's unitary method, three-factor apportionment
formula, see infra text accompanying notes 19-30.
3. 463 U.S. at 162.
4. Id. at 189 n.26, 195 n.32.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
6. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
7. Id. at 448.
8. Id. at 453.
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zation is "unitary" and then applies a three-factor apportionment
formula to the "unitary income" in order to determine the amount of
income taxable in California. Next, the effect of the Container case
upon how business organizations are determined to be "unitary" is
analyzed. The comment then examines the foreign commerce clause
analysis and its application in two recent cases, Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles' and Container Corporation of America v.
Franchise Tax Board.'° The next section uses this analysis to deter-
mine whether California's "formula apportionment" method is con-
stitutional when applied to a foreign parent corporation with a sub-
sidiary operating in California. This comment concludes that
California's formula apportionment method is unconstitutional when
applied to a foreign parent corporation.
II. CALIFORNIA'S UNITARY BUSINESS CONCEPT: FORMULA
APPORTIONMENT
The United States Supreme Court has recently considered the
limits of state taxing power over nondomiciliary multistate and mul-
tinational corporations." The Court considered whether the due
process clause12 or the commerce clause 3 of the United States Con-
stitution prevents state apportionment of the consolidated income of a
corporate taxpayer when the taxpayer performs only limited opera-
tions within the state."' The Court concluded that when a corporate
taxpayer operates a "unitary business" 15 the state may levy a tax
upon the total net corporate income that is reasonably related to the
activities conducted within the taxing state. 6
Because several methods of taxation are constitutional, taxation
9. Id. at 434.
10. 463 U.S. 159.
11. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982);
ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides in part that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8. This article provides in part that Congress shall have the
power to regulate interstate commerce.
14. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 210 (1980); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 427 (1980).
15. The Supreme Court first recognized the unitary business concept over 60 years ago.
ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 320 n.14. See text accompanying infra notes 19-20 for a definition of
unitary business.
16. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 362; ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 316; Exxon, 447 U.S. at 222-
23; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439-40.
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statutes vary from state to state.1 7 Regardless of which method a
state chooses, the threshold question remains whether the corpora-
tion subject to the tax does in fact operate as a "unitary business."1"
A corporation is part of a unitary business group if its operations are
dependent upon or contribute to the business conducted by the
group." The unitary concept is premised upon the theory that the
business activities within the state are an inseparable part of a busi-
ness conducted outside the state.2 If a group is deemed unitary, the
state may apply its method of allocating unitary income. 1
Once the unitary determination is made, the focus shifts to the
amount of corporate income that the state should include in the cor-
poration's tax base. 2 The tax base consists of all income produced
by the unitary business.2 s California uses the "formula apportion-
ment" method to determine corporate net income attributable to the
sources and activities that occur within state borders. A corporate
group which constitutes a unitary business must file a combined re-
port2' in order to calculate both the unitary income of the group and
the formula factors necessary to apportion the income.2 5
Because a state cannot exercise its income tax extraterritorially,
the total business income of an integrated group of corporations must
17. In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-79 (1978), the Supreme Court
stated that the U.S. Constitution does not favor one form of state taxation over another. In
addition, the Court has declined to single out the most appropriate method of state taxation of
corporations. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 561 (1965). See
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940); Comment, State Taxation of For-
eign Source Corporate Dividends: Another Conquest of the Expanded Unitary Business Doc-
trine, 22 WASH U. URB. L. ANN. 229, 229-30 (1981).
18. Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 479-80, 183 P.2d 16, 20-21,
(1947).
19. See infra note 26.
20. Comment, California's Corporate Franchise Tax: Taxation of Foreign Source In-
come?, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 123 (1980).
21. See Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331, 336 (1939); Wallace v. Hines,
253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920).
22. Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 272-74; Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452, 464-65 (1959).
23. See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Tax'n, 245 Minn. 346, 361, 71
N.W.2d 797, 804-05 (1955) (tax base includes income from both retail and wholesale opera-
tions); Coca Cola Co. v. Department of Revenue, 71 Or. 517, 519, 533 P.2d 788, 792 (1975)
(tax base includes income from both bottling and syrup-producing operations).
24. The "combined report" is, in effect, a consolidated return of the corporate group's
worldwide income. Carlson, State Taxation of Corporate Income From Foreign Sources, TAX
POLICY RESEARCH STUDY NUMBER THREE: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 231,
250 (1976). See also Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Concept
and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX. L. REV. 171, 197-98 (1970).
25. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 25101-25105 (West 1979).
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be apportioned to California.2 The apportioned income represents
that portion of income generated by the integrated group which is
properly attributable to activities conducted within California.27 Cal-
ifornia uses a fractional formula for apportioning worldwide income.
The numerator of the fraction is the sum of three factors: property,
payroll, and sales;2" the denominator is the number three.29 These
factors are determined by dividing the value of the corporate group's
California property by the value of its worldwide property, the
amount of its California payroll by its worldwide payroll, and the
amount of its California sales by its worldwide sales.80 After the
fraction is calculated, net taxable income is determined and the uni-
tary group may be taxed.
A. What is Unitary after Container?
Courts apply several of their own tests to determine which parts
of a business operation are within the unitary business.3" Generally
courts have held that a business is unitary if operating the business
within the taxing state depends upon or contributes to the operations
of the business outside the state.3 2
In Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax
Board,"3 the Supreme Court held that the "unitary business" con-
cept requires that some of the business be conducted in the taxing
state and that a bond of ownership or control unite the purported
unitary business." '  Container Corporation argued that under
26. 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (a state may tax only income arising from sources within the
state); Rudolph, supra note 24, at 181. The controlling question is whether the state has
provided anything to the corporation for which the state then can assess a tax in return. Wis-
consin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
27. 437 U.S. 267, 273.
28. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 25128 (West 1979).
29. Id.
30. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 2519, 25132 and 25134 (West 1979).
31. See, e.g., Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942) (unitary business
determined by unity of ownership operations and use); Western Auto Supply, 245 Minn. at
357, 71 N.W.2d at 804-05 (unitary business indicated by mutual contribution and mutual
benefits regarding interdivisional relations); Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236,
243, 38 A.2d 329, 334-35 (1944) (unitary business determined by necessity and connection of
corporate divisions to each other).
32. See G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION
101 (1946). The test of a unitary business is whether or not the operation of the portion of the
business within the state is dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the business
outside the state. Id.
33. 463 U.S. 159.
34. Id. at 166.
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ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commissioner8 and F.W.
Woolworth v. Taxation & Revenue Department,3 6 Container and its
foreign subsidiaries were not members of a unitary business."'
The Court in Container, however, noted that the "legal princi-
ples defining the constitutional limits on the unitary business princi-
ple are now well established." 8 It found that although Container's
foreign subsidiaries evidenced some autonomy, "mere decentraliza-
tion of day-to-day management responsibility and accountability can-
not defeat a unitary business finding." ' The Court upheld the ap-
proach used in Woolworth" and stated that the prerequisite to a
constitutionally acceptable finding of a unitary business is a "flow of
value" between parent and subsidiary."'
Justice Brennan stated in Container that a relevant question in
the unitary business inquiry is whether the income contributions of
the subsidiaries results from functional integration, centralization of
management, and economies of scale.42 If this inquiry is answered
affirmatively, the parent and its subsidiaries present a "functionally
integrated enterprise" which the state may tax as a single entity.43
35. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
36. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
37. Whitenack, State Tax Litigation After the Container Decision, 20 TAx NoTES 771,
773 n.4 (1983) (quoting Brief for Appellant at 49, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board,
463 U.S. 159). ASARCO involved a claim that a parent and its parties owned subsidiaries.
The court held either minority interests or majority interests were part of the same unitary
business. The state supreme court upheld the claim. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a
unitary business ruling was impermissible because the partial subsidiaries were not realisti-
cally subject to even minimal control by ASARCO, and were therefore only a "passive invest-
ment." 458 U.S. 307, 328. Woolworth involved a parent corporation and its one partially-
owned subsidiary and three wholly-owned subsidiaries. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned
the state court's unitary business determination and concluded that the legal standard applied
to the state court was improper. 458 U.S. at 354, 363.
38. 463 U.S. at 176.
39. Id. at 180 n.19 (citing Exxon, 447 U.S. 207, 224). The Court in Container found
that the foreign subsidiaries were not passive investments and therefore were not outside of the
unitary business. Specifically, it found that Container's loans and loan guarantees made on
behalf of the foreign subsidiaries constituted a "flow of value." This represented an effort to
ensure that the foreign operations of Container would continue to grow and thus to further the
corporation's profitability. Additionally, the management role of the parent corporation was
more than "organizational oversight" and pointed toward active investment. Id.
40. 458 U.S. 354.
41. 463 U.S. at 178. The most common form of a flow of value is a contribution to
income by the parent or subsidiary corporation to the other. This contribution to income can
result from functional integration, centralization of management flow of capital resources, or
economies of scale. See infra text accompanying note 42.
42. 463 U.S. at 178-79 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425, 438 (1980)).
43. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 445 U.S. 425, 440 (1980).
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The Court upheld the appellate court's finding that a functionally
integrated enterprise existed.4 4
The Container Court concluded that the scope of its review
over state court decisions regarding how to determine a unitary busi-
ness is limited to whether the state court applied the proper stan-
dard."' If the proper standard is applied, the Supreme Court will
then determine whether the state court's "judgment was within the
realm of permissible judgment."' 6 The Court stated that not all
claims that a state court erred in making a unitary business finding
will pose substantial federal questions."7
As a result of the Container decision, it appears that California
can easily justify its finding that a corporation is unitary. First, the
Court in Container ruled that the Constitution does not require ob-
jective tests to determine whether a business is unitary.' 8 The Court
relied upon the Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes 9 decision
that profits from functional integration, centralization of manage-
ment, and economies of scale were indicators of a unitary business,
but that no single indicator is determinative.5 ° Rather, it now ap-
pears sufficient if a number of indicia, similar to those found in
Container, cumulatively support the state court's decision.51 Second,
potential control, which Woolworth held was "not dispositive of the
unitary business issue, ' 52 is now considered relevant. 3  The
Container decision suggested that potential control may be consid-
ered to determine if a sufficient degree of implicit control exists to
support a unitary finding.5" The continuous flow and interchange of
products described by Justice Powell as "essential factors" in
ASARCO, are no longer essential." Finally, corporations in the same
type of business may now reasonably be presumed unitary." Thus,
the extreme view "that all income from commonly-owned business
activities should be combined and apportioned by a single formula
44. 463 U.S. at 176.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at n.14.
48. Id. at 178 n.17.
49. 445 U.S. 425, 440 (1980).
50. Id. at 179-80.
51. Id.
52. 458 U.S. at 362.
53. 463 U.S. at 177 n.16.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 178. "Continuous flow and interchange of products" refer to intercompany
transactions between parent and subsidiary.
56. Id. at 179.
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without inquiring as to whether such activities are unitary or sepa-
rate in nature"5 could be embraced.
Because a unitary finding is likely to be upheld, a successful
challenge to California's apportionment formula has little chance of
success. The Court has concluded that the Constitution permits
states to enact different statutory variations of the unitary business
concept.58 California's three-factor formula is now a standard for
judging the fairness of other formulas. Consequently, only domestic
taxpayers with complaints less extreme than those in Container
could successfully petition the Supreme Court. Taxation of a foreign
parent corporation, however, presents a problem which differs from
the unitary issue.
III. THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
Both the due process and commerce clauses of the United States
Constitution limit a state's ability to tax income arising out of inter-
state activities. Well-established Supreme Court guidelines provide
that no undue state tax burden exists when: 1) a substantial nexus
exists between the taxed activity and the state, 2) the tax is fairly
apportioned, 3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and 4) the tax is fairly related to the services provided by the
state. 9 In Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles,"0 however, the
Court held that a state must satisfy a more extensive constitutional
inquiry when dealing with foreign instrumentalities.61
A. Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles
In Japan Line, the Supreme Court required additional scrutiny
under the Foreign Commerce Clause as it is applied to foreign cor-
porations."' Six Japanese shipping companies were the taxpayers in
Japan Line. The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem
property tax upon the companies' shipping containers which were
located in Los Angeles harbor. The Japanese companies had been
organized and incorporated under the law of Japan and they were
domiciled there. The shipping containers, the property subjected to
57. Keesling, A Current Look at the Combined Report, 1975 J. OF TAX'N 106, 109.
58. 463 U.S. at 166-67.
59. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 2'74, 279 (1977); Washington Reve-
nue Dept. v. Stevedore Assn., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978).
60. 441 U.S. 434.
61. Id. at 447.
62. Id.
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the tax, were used exclusively in foreign commerce. As well as being
taxed by the County of Los Angeles, all of the taxpayers' containers
were subject to a Japanese property tax which was based upon 100
percent of their value.
The taxpayers contended that the Los Angeles property tax
contravened the federal government's power under the foreign com-
merce clause. The Court, using standards set forth in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,38 first found that the tax in question satisfied
the constitutional requirements demanded by the due process and in-
terstate commerce clauses. 4 Nevertheless, the Court rejected the
County's argument that the same analysis applied regardless of
whether interstate or foreign commerce was involved.6"
The Court held that when a state imposes a tax upon instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce, a twofold inquiry beyond that man-
dated by Complete Auto is required."' The court must first inquire
whether the tax creates a substantial risk of multiple taxation. Sec-
ond, the court must determine whether the tax impairs federal uni-
formity in an area in which federal uniformity is essential, and thus
prevents the federal government from "speaking with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments."6 A state
tax that contravenes either of these requirements is unconstitutional.
Applying those additional considerations to the facts in Japan
Line, the Court held that the Los Angeles tax resulted in multiple
taxation in fact." The Court also found that California's tax frus-
trated federal uniformity and prevented the federal government from
63. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
64. 441 U.S. at 441, 445-46.
65. Id. at 447.
66. Id. at 452.
67. Id. Addressing the second prong the Court stated:
A state tax on instrumentalities of foreign commerce may frustrate the achieve-
ment of federal uniformity in several ways. If the State imposes an apportioned
tax, international disputes over reconciling apportionment formulae may arise.
If a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax structure,
foreign nations disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate against American-owned
instrumentalities present in their jurisdictions. Such retaliation of necessity
would be directed at American [corporations] in general, not just that of the
taxing state, so that the Nation as a whole would suffer. If other States followed
the taxing State's example, various instrumentalities of commerce could be sub-
jected to varying degrees of multiple taxation, a result that would plainly pre-
vent this Nation from "speaking with one voice" in regulating foreign
commerce.
Id. at 451-52.
68. Id. at 453.
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"speaking with one voice" in international trade."9 In fact, United
States-Japan treaties reflect that California's tax was inconsistent
with national policy."0 Accordingly, the tax was struck down for vio-
lating the foreign commerce clause. But the Court in Japan Line
specifically reserved the question of the "taxability of domestically
owned instrumentalities 71 engaged in foreign commerce," and cited
two California Supreme Court decisions which upheld the imposi-
tion of property taxes in such situations. 72 This reservation in Japan
Line paved the way for the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board."3
B. Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board
In Container, California sought to impose an income tax on the
basis of a domestic corporation's apportioned worldwide unitary in-
come. The defendant, Container Corporation, contended that the tax
violated the foreign commerce clause under the Japan Line analysis
because it resulted in actual multiple taxation and violated the uni-
form international arm's length standard of taxation.74 The Court
disagreed and upheld California's method of formula
apportionment.75
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging the similarities
between Container and Japan Line. First, both of the disputed taxes
resulted in double taxation. 76 Second, the double taxation resulted
from the application of different taxation methods by California and
foreign authorities. 7 Third, the internationally accepted arm's
69. Id. at 452-53.
70. Treaties between the United States and Japan evidence the desirability of uniform
taxation of containers which are used exclusively in foreign commerce. This uniform treatment
resulted in exempting from tax any foreign-owned containers temporarily located in the
United States. Id.
71. The term "instrumentality" includes a corporation for purposes of this comment. In
Container, Justice Brennan also used the term when referring to Container Corporation. He
analogized a corporation to a cargo container because in Japan Line, the containers were the
instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce. 463 U.S. at 188-89.
72. Id. at 444 n.7. The cases cited by the Court were Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. County
of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974) (domestically-owned
containers used in intercoastal and foreign commerce held subject to apportioned property tax),
and Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 323 (1958)
(domestically owned aircraft used in foreign commerce held subject to apportioned property
tax).
73. 463 U.S. 159.
74. Id. at 162-63.
75. Id. at 197.
76. Id. at 187.
77. Id.
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length taxation method was consistent with the method used by the
foreign taxing authorities."8 Finally, the Court found that the inter-
nationally accepted method was preferred by the federal govern-
ment." The Court, however, also distinguished Japan Line on sev-
eral grounds. The Court noted that Japan Line involved a property
tax rather than a tax on income.80 The Court also found that the
existing double taxation was "not the 'inevitabl[e]' result of the Cali-
fornia taxing scheme,"'" and therefore did not meet the substantial
risk of multiple taxation test. More importantly, the Court concluded
that California had imposed the tax upon a corporation domiciled
and headquartered in the United States, unlike Japan Line in which
an instrumentality of foreign commerce was subjected to taxation. 82
That final point emphasizes the question left unanswered in
Container: whether California's formula apportionment method is
constitutional if it taxes a corporation domiciled and headquartered
outside of the United States."
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
ANALYSIS TO A FOREIGN PARENT CORPORATION
Japan Line established that a state tax violates the foreign com-
merce clause if the tax "creates a substantial risk of multiple taxa-
tion" or impairs federal uniformity and prevents the federal govern-
ment from "speaking with one voice" on foreign commerce.8 4 When
those foreign commerce clause principles are applied to the case of a
foreign parent corporation with a California subsidiary, California's
formula apportionment method is unconstitutional.
A. Multiple Taxation
The Supreme Court in Japan Line clearly stated that "[e]ven a
slight overlapping of tax . . . assumes importance when sensitive




81. Id. (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447).
82. 463 U.S. at 189. The majority of the Court noted that the double taxation was the
result of allocating the income of a multinational enterprise by using two distinct methods.
83. The Court in Container specifically stated: "We have no need to address in this
opinion the constitutionality of combined apportionment with respect to state taxation of do-
mestic corporations with foreign parents .... " Id. at 189 n.26.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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cerned."' Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in
Container pointed out that the California method of taxing corpo-
rate income not only creates a substantial risk of international multi-
ple taxation but has also resulted in double taxation. 6 The majority
of the Container Court, however, was able to distinguish the actual
double taxation in that case from the double taxation which was
found unconstitutional in Japan Line. 7
The Court found that when two two different methods are used
to allocate the income of a multinational enterprise, determining
whether any resulting double taxation is constitutional depends upon
the facts of each case.8" Multiple tax burdens alone are not sufficient
to impugn a fairly apportioned tax; the context in which the double
tax arises and the alternatives available to the taxing state must be
considered.89 The Court was not convinced that the use of the inter-
national arm's-length standard,9 ° as opposed to formula apportion-
ment, would necessarily remove the risks of international multiple
taxation. 9'
The Court's Container approach differed from that used in Ja-
pan Line. Japan Line held that one jurisdiction's "right to tax a
given value in full" and another's right to tax the same entity in
part" necessarily resulted in double taxation. 2 In Japan Line, the
containers subjected to California tax were also subjected to property
tax in Japan at their full value.9" Because both California and Ja-
pan had levied a tax, it was inevitable that Japan Line would pay a
double tax. The Court held that the California taxing scheme was
unconstitutional because it caused this result.94 Unlike the double tax
85. 441 U.S. at 456.
86. 463 U.S. at 187. The Majority in Container explained that the double taxation
resulted because California's formula apportionment method seriously diverged from the meth-
ods adopted by international authorities and by our own federal government. Id.
87. Id. at 189-193.
88. Id. at 188.
89. Id. at 189.
90. The arm's-length standard is a form of separate accounting. Under separate ac-
counting, business within the state is treated separately and distinctly from business outside the
state; the income is computed as if the taxpayer's activities were confined solely to the taxing
state. F. Keesling & J. Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 42, 43 (1960). This method necessitates the computation of all intercorporate
transactions on an "arms-length" basis. Id. This requires that a hypothetical selling price be
determined, which treats the parties in the intercorporate transaction as if they were bargain-
ing in a freely competitive market situation.
91. 463 U.S. at 190-93.
92. Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434, 447-55.
93. "Full value" taxation is an unapportioned form of taxing.
94. 441 U.S. at 451-52.
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result found in Japan Line, the Court in Container held that the
double taxation was not a direct result of the California taxing
scheme.95
The factors the Container Court relied upon to distinguish Ja-
pan Line have less significance when applied to a foreign parent
corporation. In order to prevent multiplicity, yet allow states the
power to raise revenues, the Supreme Court has required that taxes
be apportioned among taxing jurisdictions so that no instrumentality
of commerce is subjected to more than one tax on its full value."
Therefore, no state is permitted to tax an instrumentality in fully 7
As stated in Japan Line, the Court's basis for approval of appor-
tioned taxation rests in "its ability to enforce full apportionment by
all potential taxing bodies.""
The Court in Container distinguished Japan Line because that
case involved a foreign corporation." While full tax apportionment
of a domestic corporation may be successfully enforced, the Court in
Container noted that the legal consequence of a tax upon a foreign
parent corporation has more significance.' 00 If a foreign parent cor-
poration is involved, a court is unlikely to have the ability to enforce
full apportionment because of jurisdictional problems. As the Japan
Line Court clearly stated, "neither [the] Court nor [our] Nation can
ensure full apportionment when one of the taxing entities is a for-
eign sovereign."'' 1
Multiple taxation can occur if a foreign sovereign chooses to tax
corporations domiciled in its country and its subsidiaries abroad at
full value. The resulting multiple taxation is inevitable because a
state also taxes the foreign parent company's subsidiary, albeit on an
apportioned basis, which is operating within the state's borders. Cal-
ifornia should be precluded from taxing a foreign parent and its sub-
sidiary through its unitary business method. No assurance of full
apportionment exists and therefore a high likelihood of multiple tax-
ation results from the unitary method.
95. See supra text accompanying note 81.
96. 441 U.S. at 446-47.
97. Id. at 447-48.
98. Id. Although Japan Line involved an unconstitutional property tax, and not an in-
come tax, the Court stated that it was "a commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that
multiple taxation may well be offensive to the commerce clause." 441 U.S. at 446. In addition,
the Court spoke of taxation in a general context without limiting its discussion to the taxation
of property. Id. at 446.
99. 463 U.S. at 188-89.
100. Id. at 195 n.32.
101. 441 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).
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It is difficult to distinguish Container in a foreign parent con-
text because all existing multiple taxation cannot be the inevitable
result of California's taxing scheme. The internationally accepted
method, arm's-length separate accounting, was recognized by the
Majority to be a system "subject to manipulation" which often ig-
nores "unquantifiable transfers of value." 0 2 But, as the dissent ar-
gued, separate accounting and formula apportionment are so incom-
patible that double taxation must be "inevitable."1 3 The Majority,
however, failed to yield because as it noted, "arm's-length" separate
accounting would "not eliminate the risk of double taxation"10 4 ei-
ther. The Court concluded that California should not be required to
"give up one allocation method . . . in favor of another . . . that
also sometimes results in double taxation.
1 0 5
This argument fails to comport with the foreign commerce
clause because it allows California to tax a foreign instrumentality in
a manner which may result in multiple taxation. California's
formula apportionment produces the inevitable risk of double taxa-
tion because its basic assumptions are fundamentally different from
methods used in international jurisdictions."" California's method
allocates a higher proportion of income to itself because its allocation
factors are based on higher wage rates, property values, and sales
prices than those in most international taxation jurisdictions."0 To
this extent, the method "inherently leads to double taxation" '
which cannot be avoided without changing the system itself.
In contrast, separate accounting produces only a possible risk of
multiple taxation. This risk results from different applications of the
same tax system among taxing jurisdictions.'0 9 Any double taxation
which results in this context is "more likely to be resolved by inter-
national negotiation." ' Certainly if California is to adopt a method
102. 463 U.S. at 164-65.
103. Id. at 201 (Powell, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
105. Id. 193. The majority in Container noted that the application of a worldwide com-
bined apportionment method had resulted in a refund to the taxpayer in Chicago Bridge of
Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983). However, the mere receipt of a
refund does not rule out the possibility of double taxation resulting due to the use of a state's
taxing method. In addition, Chicago Bridge dealt with a tax return that did not involve foreign
income or foreign apportionment factors. Id. at 188 n.25.
106. 463 U.S. at 198.
107. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 538-39
(4th ed. 1978).
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which results in multiple taxation of a foreign corporation, it should
at least be required to choose the method least likely to produce such
a result. Nevertheless, if either method produces actual multiple tax-
ation, the foreign commerce clause dictates that the method be held
unconstitutional.
The imposition of multiple taxation on a foreign parent corpo-
ration presents a particularly serious violation of the foreign com-
merce clause which should allow a court to distinguish Container.
First, the state tax will fall upon a foreign rather than a domestic
corporation, thus exceeding the jurisdiction of the state tax authority.
Second, the court will be unable to enforce full apportionment which
will result in an inevitable multiple tax.
Both Container and Japan Line concluded that any state taxing
method which produces an inevitable multiple tax must be struck
down.'11 Because California's formula apportionment violates this
principle in a foreign parent context, it must be held
unconstitutional.
B. One Voice Standard
Assuming that a unitary tax applied to a foreign parent case
can survive the multiple taxation inquiry of the foreign commerce
clause, it must then pass muster under the one voice standard enun-
ciated in Japan Line." 2
Several Supreme Court decisions have reflected the Court's
awareness that taxation of foreign commerce requires federal uni-
formity."' The Court elaborated on this requirement in Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages 1 4 by stating that "the federal government must
speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with for-
eign governments. '"i More recently, in Container the Court held
that if the tax in question "either implicates foreign policy issues
which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear
111. Container, 463 U.S. at 159; Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434.
112. 441 U.S. at 450.
113. See, e.g., Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904); Bowman v. Chicago & N.R.
Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
114. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
115. Id. at 285. Several policy reasons exist which justify the need for uniformity and
the ability to speak with one voice in foreign affairs. First, there is the need to deal in a unified
manner with foreign nations. In addition, federal revenue, which otherwise may be disrupted
by state action, should be presented. Also, there is a need to preserve harmony among the
states. See Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contempo-
rary Comment, 25 MINN L. REV. 432, 446-49 (1941).
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federal directive"116 the one voice standard is violated. The most ob-
vious foreign policy implication of a state tax is the threat of retalia-
tion by the foreign nation in which the corporation is domiciled."
1. Foreign Policy Implications
A state tax method such as California's formula apportionment
may frustrate the goal of federal uniformity because it subjects a for-
eign parent corporation to income tax. In Container, the Court
noted that a "legal incidence" of taxing a foreign parent corporation
may implicate foreign policy more than taxing a domestic corpora-
tion. " 8 Foreign governments have legitimate grounds to complain
when a heavier tax is calculated on the basis of income of corpora-
tions domiciled in their countries. 1' California's tax has the effect of
discouraging American investment in foreign countries'"0 because
those countries may now subject American companies to some form
of economic retaliation. Additionally, foreign companies may refuse
to do business in California if they are subjected to a double tax.
If such an imbalance in the international tax structure results, a
foreign sovereign might retaliate militarily against the United States.
In that event, the nation as a whole and not just the taxing state,
would suffer.' Moreover, the federal government would plainly be
prevented from speaking with one voice if other states applied Cali-
fornia's unitary taxation method.
Foreign nations have already expressed their displeasure with
California's taxing scheme and with the outcome of the Container
decision. The Kingdom of the Netherlands has indicated that it will
take action in opposition to worldwide formula apportionment, par-
ticularly when a foreign parent corporation is involved.' 2 2 In addi-
tion, Japan intends to refuse to expand its business in California
116. 463 U.S. at 194.
117. Id. (Retaliation by foreign nations may occur in several forms. Foreign trading
partners may refuse to sign or honor current income tax treaties. Foreign nations may impose
severe tax measures upon the U. S. companies conducting business in offended countries. For-
eign trading may be suspended indefinitely. Or such retaliation may ultimately lead to war
against our country).
118. Id. at 195 n.32.
119. Id. at 202 (Powell, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. 441 U.S. at 450-51.
122. Javaras and Browne, Litigation Prospects After Container, 21 TAx NOTES 1027,
1030 (1983). The Kingdom of the Netherlands has announced that it will not sign a newly
agreed upon income tax treaty with the United States unless the foreign parent issue can be
resolved.
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because of that state's method of unitary taxation.123 Canada also
joined the ranks of possible retaliating countries when it recently
stated that it would file an amicus curiae brief to support a chal-
lenge against California's unitary tax system." 4 This foreign dis-
pleasure implicates foreign policy issues that should be left to the
federal government and not to the states. Thus, unitary taxation of a
foreign parent also fails to satisfy the one voice standard." 5
2. Inconsistency With a Clear Federal Directive
A state may also violate the one voice standard if its tax is in-
consistent with a clear federal directive.' 26 This inconsistency can oc-
cur in several instances.
Our tax treaty system is one such directive in this area. The
United States federal government has a strong national interest in
harmonizing international taxation systems. This interest includes
promoting the efficient flow of trade and investment. One way to
harmonize tax systems is to develop treaties with foreign nations.
These treaties do not apply to taxes imposed upon domestic parent
corporations, 2 but they do apply to foreign parent corporations.' 2 8
Many of these treaties require the adoption of some form of arm's-
length separate accounting.' 9 California's income taxation of foreign
entities would clearly violate the federal policy expressed in many of
these treaties if the state required the adoption of a different tax
method, such as formula apportionment.
Another federal directive occurs when the executive branch
voices its position in an area of national policy. In Container the
Court noted that the executive branch had decided not to file an ami-
cus curiae brief opposing the state tax.' The executive branch,
however, had stated its position in an amicus curiae brief for an-
123. A delegation from the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations regards Cali-
fornia's unitary tax system as "very unreasonable and unfair." According to the delegation,
most Japanese companies will cease new investment or expansion in California because of the
formula apportionment method. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 11, 1984, at 47, col. 5.
124. 22 TAX NOTES 15 (1984). France, the United Kingdom, and Japan have chal-
lenged California's unitary tax system by submitting amicus curiae briefs.
125. One commentator noted that the unitary method of taxation in a "domestic con-
text" is sound. But in his view a worldwide application results in "inequitable ... interna-
tional double taxation" and suffers from an "even more compelling constitutional defect" be-
cause it violates the one voice standard. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 23, 1983, at 12, col. 4.
126. 463 U.S. at 193-94.
127. 463 U.S. at 196.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 195.
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other case before the Court during the same term in which
Container was heard. The Solicitor General on behalf of the execu-
tive branch stated in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co."' that imposing a state tax on the "apportioned com-
bined worldwide business income of a unitary group of related cor-
porations including foreign corporations, impairs federal uniformity
in an area where such uniformity is essential."' 2 Presuming that the
Government's views have not changed, California's tax directly con-
flicts with this expression of federal policy.
Therefore, California's tax method plainly impairs federal uni-
formity. First, it is inconsistent with the method chosen and pre-
ferred by the federal government in its treaties. Second, it is inconsis-
tent with the position taken by the executive branch in an area of
national policy.
V. CONCLUSION
After the Container decision, it may now be easier for a state to
find a "unitary" group."' A foreign parent corporation, however,
presents a significantly different set of facts from that in Container.
Unlike the domestic corporation facts in Container, unitary taxation
of the foreign parent corporation inevitably results in double taxa-
tion. In addition, the Supreme Court does not have the same ability
to assure full apportionment with foreign parent corporations as it
does with a domestic corporation. Because of this multiple taxation,
the first requirement of the foreign commerce clause cannot be
satisfied.
California's tax on foreign-owned or organized corporations has
provoked reactions from foreign nations. This foreign displeasure
prevents federal uniformity. Furthermore, California's taxation
method directly conflicts with the federal directive of the interna-
tional arm's-length, separate accounting method of taxation which is
embodied in numerous government treaties. Formula apportionment
also conflicts with the executive branch's view that foreign corpora-
tions should be taxed by the internationally accepted methods. Thus,
California's unitary tax also violates the one voice standard. Califor-
131. 463 U.S. 1220.
132. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983)
(memorandum for the United States as amicus curaie).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 48-57.
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nia's tax system as applied to a foreign parent corporation should be
held unconstitutional because it violates both of these inquiries.
Randel Mathias
